Multiple Realization: A Critique of the Selectionist Account

Authors

  • Diego Ríos Conicet, INEO, Unsam

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36446/rlf2021174

Keywords:

multiple realization, selection, reduction, evolutionary explanations

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the selective argument that has been used to justify multiple realization. Our approach is presented in three steps. First, we isolate a problem; then, we describe an alleged solution to this problem; finally, we criticize this solution. The problem is how non-uniform realizers can produce uniform effects. The alleged solution consists in introducing a selective mechanism that retains those realizers that are capable of producing adaptive effects despite lacking a common physical structure. Finally, we criticize this solution arguing that selection cannot explain multiple realization for at least two reasons. To begin with, because multiple realization presupposes the existence of variation, which is exogenous to the selective process. Second, because selection eliminates variation rather than promoting it. The advocates of the selective model of multiple realization have correctly identified a problem, but they failed to show that selection is a sound solution to it

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Published

2021-11-01

How to Cite

Ríos, D. (2021). Multiple Realization: A Critique of the Selectionist Account. Latin American Journal of Philosophy, 47(2), 265–281. https://doi.org/10.36446/rlf2021174

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Section

Articles