Towards an Analysis of De Interpretatione 9: Aristotle’s Critique of the Determinist Theories in Light of the Analysis of Future Contingents

Authors

  • Diego Alejandro Tabakian UBA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36446/rlf2021192

Keywords:

determinism, fatalismo, necessity, truth

Abstract

Since Antiquity, Aristotle's De Interpretatione chapter 9 has been object of multiple interpretative discussions: from the logical principles involved in the argumentation to the Aristotelian conception of time and necessity. In this presentation, we analyze the problem of the truth-value of propositions about future contingent events in order to elucidate the physical and ontological presuppositions underlying Aristotle's conception of truth. Our interpretative strategy consist in analyze certain concepts of De Interpretatione 9 (such as “causality”, “necessity”, “chance”, etc.) in correspondence with their explicit conceptualizations in Physics II. 1, 8, 9 and Metaphysics V. 5 y VI. 3. Since Aristotle criticizes his opponent without rendering explicit his deterministic conception, the arguments of De Interpretatione 9 are very difficult to reconstruct. We appeal to these treatises to elucidate the determinist argumentation and the Aristotelian critique.

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Published

2021-11-01

How to Cite

Tabakian, D. A. (2021). Towards an Analysis of De Interpretatione 9: Aristotle’s Critique of the Determinist Theories in Light of the Analysis of Future Contingents. Latin American Journal of Philosophy, 47(2), 383–409. https://doi.org/10.36446/rlf2021192

Issue

Section

Dossier La noción de phýsis en Aristóteles y sus proyecciones