The Theory of Definition in Spinoza, Leibniz and Tschirnhaus

Abstract

Leibniz, Spinoza and Tschirnhaus exchanged opinions on various philosophical questions, among them the problematic about the nature of the method and the perfect definition. However, studies on the relationship between these philosophers generally ignored the methodological question. In the present work we will make a contribution to fill that gap, examining the results of the exchange mentioned in the methodological projects of the three philosophers. In particular, we focus on the analysis of the theory of definition, since it is the key point of the methodological conceptions of the three philosophers. We will try to show that Spinoza, by combining Hobbes’ methodological elements with Cartesian epistemological elements, exerted an important influence on Leibniz and Tschirnhaus about what the perfect and most suitable definition should be for the method whose objective is to reach the truth. In view of this objective, we will carry out a comparative examination focused on the function assigned to the definition in the methodological structure, as well as in the way in which each one conceives the nature of the same.