Epistemic Injustice in the History of Philosophy: Caroline of Ansbach and the so-called Leibniz-Clarke Controversy

Abstract

The exchange between Leibniz and Clarke from 1715 to 1716 has been the object of numerous scholarly articles. In fact, the text that is usually known as “Leibniz's first paper” is actually an extract of a letter to Princess Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach, and therefore not intended for Clarke himself, who would be included only after she passed the extract of Leibniz’s letter to him. However, her role in the dispute as more important than a mere intermediary for the dispute has been acknowledged only recently. Now Domenico Bertoloni Meli (1999), and more recently, Gregory Brown (2004) focused on Leibniz’s agenda (and his Newtonian counterparts), which may obscure Caroline’s own point of view. My purpose in this article is to focus on the few occasions Caroline took to describe how she sees her role in the controversy. By introducing the salon as an institution that broadens our understanding of the early modern intellectual space and give voice to women engaging in epistemic practices, Caroline as a participant of the controversy can be regarded as an appropriate object of study. In this way, I hope we have advanced in correcting our epistemic injustice against Caroline.