The “Ethics of the Best” in Leibniz’s Thought: What Does It Mean to Presume God’s Will to Act?

Abstract

This article examines the commandment which prescribes that “we must act following God’s presumptive will”, in order to solve the tension that would exist in Leibniz between a deontological ethics of positive laws and a “teleological ethics of the best” demanding the application of the principle of the best. For that, we firstly present the apparent paradox between principles that would unconditionally obligate (declared divine will) and principles whose obligation would be conditioned by the presumption of divine will by the wise man (presumed divine will). Secondly, it is shown that such a precept derives its moral validity from a divine origin by a modal examination of the proposition on which it is grounded. Finally, a hermeneutic analysis of this commandment, based on the concept of presumption, is offered in order to conciliate the paradox.